Most European leaders lack strategic focus, and the scale of security and economic challenges dwarfs their political potential to guide societies. It is an invitation to a new wave of populists.
Donald Trump is already re-shaping transatlantic diplomacy as he appears in Europe instead of Joe Biden. Additionally, his electoral manifestos have forced leading nations to re-assess European security.
PM Donald Tusk has tried to position Poland to lead this ‘new political landscape’, hosting a series of meetings in preparation for peace talks, Trump’s inauguration and the Polish EUCO Presidency. However, the EU remains greatly divided on strategy and lacks credibility on account of low defence spending.
Work on the Eastern Shield begins – and leaders start to plan for the European Democracy Shield. Poland hopes the likely election of Friedrich Merz will facilitate a collective outlook as German Chancellor.
Recent developments underscore the importance of strengthening Europe‘s defence as well as societal resilience – see our ‘Shielding European Democracy’.
In the face of Russian interference, Moldova only narrowly voted in favour of EU membership. The weakness of electoral and democratic integrity was apparent in the shock victory of far-right, pro-Russian Cǎlin Georgescu in now-annulled Romanian elections.
PMs Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico still bet on Russian supplies and Chinese EVs despite flagging economies, becoming chief EU DIMI actors in the process.
This newly prepared overview draws on insights from our weekly outlooks, which continuously monitor democratic security trends in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as contributions from Visegrad Insight fellows across the region.
Donald Tusk is hoping Poland can reorganise Europe during its EUCO presidency, so as to secure collective defence and democratic resilience. If successful, this will likely be helped by the replacement of Olaf Scholz with Friedrich Merz as German Chancellor after February elections.
How CEE politics shapes the policies of the EU
After Donald Trump’s election win on 6 November, Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán presented himself as a mediator between the EU and the US. He declared that the pair ‘have big plans for the future’ and that Trump ‘will bring us peace!’. Slovak PM Robert Fico labelled his return a decisive defeat of liberal ideas.
There is no doubt that Trump is already re-shaping US diplomacy ahead of his inauguration on 20 January 2025. Serious concerns remain about the security guarantees of any potential peace deal with Vladimir Putin, yet Trump’s insistence has shifted President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s public stance: from a focus on victory plans to an admittance that Ukraine must do what it can to end the war through diplomacy.
Similarly, Trump‘s promise to leave NATO should allies not pay their share – and impose tariffs of up to 20% on the EU – has forced leading nations to re-assess European security.
Yet the conclusion of the Hungarian EUCO Presidency brings to an end what influence Orbán had on the international stage. He might draw praise from Trump, as he did for allegedly negotiating a ‘Christmas ceasefire’ with Putin – but the reality is that Kyiv was not even consulted and that such calls are more about ensuring the flow of cheap Russian gas into Hungary.
Orbán and Fico rely on this for their political capital, and both have become increasingly desperate to counter flagging economies and the ending of Russian gas transit via Ukraine on 1 January – with Fico even visiting Putin on 22 December.
PM Donald Tusk has positioned Poland to lead this ‘new political landscape’, hosting a series of meetings in preparation for peace talks and Trump’s inauguration. The diplomatic heads of France, Germany, Ukraine, Italy, Spain and the UK descended on Warsaw on 19 November for the thousandth day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Tusk then joined a summit in Sweden to talk defence with the Scandinavian and Baltic states, and has since visited Zelenskyy in Lviv and hosted French President Emmanuel Macron and likely future German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Warsaw.
This preludes the Polish EUCO Presidency, which Tusk hopes will start to turn the EU into a body capable not just of ‘survival’ but also of ‘political offensive’. Before 6 November, the PM made clear that the result should not matter: ‘the future of Europe depends…first and foremost on us. On the condition Europe finally grows up and believes in its own strength.’
However, such meetings have done little so far to deliver the leadership that is needed – for instance on defence spending. Warsaw influences NATO policy due to its geographical location, hawkish view of Russia – long voiced by CEE countries – and defence spending, but there is a long way to go to reach FM Radosław Sikorski’s aim to make ‘Europe think in Polish’.
‘Western unity brought by the full-scale invasion three years ago is now under greater strain than ever before. Tensions are likely to escalate between countries that view Russia as a direct and long-term threat to Europe (e.g., the NB8 and Poland), those grappling with war fatigue and internal political turmoil (e.g., Germany, France and the United States) and nations prioritising national sovereignty (e.g., Hungary and Slovakia),’ says Merili Arjakas, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Estonia and research fellow at ICDS.
Recent events have also underscored the importance of strengthening Europe‘s societal resilience as well as its defence – as we write in our ‘Shielding European Democracy’ report. DIMI (Democracy Information Manipulation and Interference) actors seek to divide and demobilise, so the EU must reinforce the democratic ideals that ensure a robust defence posture.
This was exemplified by the shock victory of far-right, pro-Russian Cǎlin Georgescu in the first round of Romanian presidential elections on 24 November. The result was later annulled on the basis of intelligence reports that Georgescu benefited from a Kremlin-driven TikTok campaign – like the FIMI ops Moscow has run in Ukraine and Moldova. The decision will ease fears about the future of a key NATO member, set to have the largest naval NATO base in Europe.
However, the result highlighted the weakness of Romanian democratic institutions – and how foreign interference capitalises on such weakness. For instance, reports have shown how the center-right Romanian National Liberal Party paid for a campaign on TikTok that ultimately favoured Georgescu. In this light, the election was primarily a voicing of discontent with a government accused of corruption and mismanagement. The fact it was a surprise raises further questions about the public and information spheres in Romania.
‘One can say that Romania is the original test case for the European Democracy Shield. But, before insisting only on foreign interference, we should take a look at some of the underground, deep-state actors that use instruments related to foreign interference in order to promote their own nationalist agenda, or party politics. Blaming the Russians is too easy, as weaknesses start at home,‘ says Radu Albu-Comǎnescu, Visegrad Insight Fellow from Romania and Lecturer at the ‘Babeş-Bolyai’ University of Cluj-Napoca.
A week later, Tusk had listed private TV stations TVN and Polsat as strategic companies to protect them from hostile takeovers – including Orbán proxies, like Hungary’s TV2 owner József Vida, and the Czech PPF group. The PM said this was prompted by Russian interference in Romania’s elections. Yet a high-level Polish diplomat told Visegrad Insight that primary digital interference in Romania stemmed from a domestic straw man, not of direct Russian origin. The Polish government may therefore be preempting possible malign influence from within.
Tusk was proven right in his weariness of Orbán’s potential influence on Polish democracy, after the latter granted former minister and PiS loyalist Marcin Romanowski political asylum in Hungary, complicating extradition efforts much like when PiS-loyalist judge Tomasz Szmydt fled to Belarus.
The return of Trump combined with rising Russian hybrid warfare has thus heightened focus on the need to defend and develop our democracies. Discussions on EC President Ursula von der Leyen’s European Democracy Shield (EDS) will likely start in the second half of 2025 – following the formation of the EDS committee. Her special advisor, Sauli Niinistö, has already prepared a report calling for a new approach to civil and military readiness. With its EUCO Presidency focused on strengthening EU security ‘in all its dimensions: external, internal, information, economic, energy, food and health,‘ Poland is asking its European allies the question: how do Europe’s pro-democratic forces win wars and elections?
Between European Unity and Disunity
The ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD), Liberal Party (PNL), Save Romania Union (USR) and Hungarian party (UDMR) agreed to form a coalition after winning 60% of the vote in parliamentary elections on 1 December – signing a pro-EU and Euro-Atlantic declaration. This allayed fears of a far-right rival after Cǎlin Georgescu won 23% support in the first round of Romania’s presidential elections. Nonetheless, the results reflect a deeply fragmented political system.
‘Romania has entered a time of political upheaval not seen in the last 35 years, threatening the very foundations of its still young democracy. However, Romanian mainstream and supposedly pro-European politicians are still in denial over what happened to them. They will continue their inept political dance, ignoring the fact that 40% of Romanians are completely fed up and ready to support any political initiative that comes from outside the system,’ says Adrian Mihaltianu, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Romania and Editorial Director at PressOne.
The centre-right GERB Party won Bulgarian parliamentary elections with 26% backing on 27 October – in a vote marred by reports of electoral fraud. A group of hacktivists published a list of 200 people it said were buying votes for sanctioned oligarch Delyan Peevski’s DPS-New Beginning. No coalition government has been formed so far, with the spectre of an eighth election in three years on the horizon. Such instability has seen a drop in trust in the Bulgarian government to 6%, per a bTV poll. It has also seen pro-Russia parties gain ground.
Lithuania’s Social Democratic Party (LSDP) secured its first victory in parliamentary elections in 12 years on 13 October, winning 20% support. To form a coalition, however, it had to include the populist Nemunas Dawn Party – whose leader Remigijus Žemaitaitis resigned from parliament in April after it was ruled that he had stirred antisemitic hate on social media.
In Hungary, the Tisza Party now leads Fidesz by 11% in opinion polls – the largest margin to date – according to the latest Median survey. Orbán and Tisza leader Péter Magyar have been campaigning in the countryside to garner support but in markedly different ways. Orbán appears unexpectedly to avoid media attention and promotes the propaganda-filled national consultation about economic neutrality. Magyar promotes his events on social media, with visits to schools, hospitals and orphanages designed to highlight their negative state – and blame Fidesz for stealing EU funds. At an EP session on 7 October, Magyar’s first chance to quiz Orbán publically, he condemned Fidesz for turning Hungary into ‘officially the poorest and most corrupt country in the EU.’
‘The government of Robert Fico is going through an extremely challenging period and there is open talk of the possibility of early elections. Even though the coalition still holds a slim majority of 76 votes in parliament, the absence or rebellion of just one MP prevents the government from passing laws,‘ says Eva Mihočková, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Slovakia and Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy SFPA.
Such turbulence follows the departure of three members of the far-right Slovak National Party (SNS). However, Fico retains the support of President Peter Pellegrini on important changes, like the decision to strip former liberal President Andrej Kiska of his state pension. The move was made possible by Pellegrini’s approval of special legislation which says a president’s pension ceases if they have been convicted. Kiska was charged with tax fraud in October, but many see this as revenge against a politician with whom Fico quarrelled bitterly.
The man Pellegrini beat to the presidency, former diplomat Ivan Korčok, meanwhile announced that he will join Progressive Slovakia (PS) – as part of a plan to defeat PM and Smer party chair Fico and win elections in 2027. This could mark a shift in strategy for PS, as Korčok appeals to voters on the right as opposed to those of usual PS rivals like Hlas.
The Civic Coalition (KO) maintains a narrow lead over the Law and Justice (PiS) Party, with 33% support against 32%, according to a United Survey for Wirtualna Polska. However, 47% of the Polish population feels that little has changed in their lives since Tusk’s coalition government took office a year ago – per a survey carried out for radio RMF FM and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. 13.6% said they feel better off, while 37.5% said they have seen a deterioration in conditions.
Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski became the official KO candidate for presidential elections in May 2025, defeating FM Radosław Sikorski with 75% support in KO primaries. PiS selected Karol Nawrocki – the head of the state-run Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). The lesser-known historian has never held a top government post, but this means he is relatively untarnished by PiS controversies. It also allows him to campaign as a candidate allegedly for all citizens (‘kandydat obywatelski’). He has the potential to accumulate many right-leaning voters, especially as he gains notoriety, meaning Trzaskowki’s current lead could easily turn into a 50/50 race.
The populist ANO Party of billionaire ex-PM Andrej Babiš remains dominant in polls with 37% support per the November Kantar survey. A separate Median poll also projects the anti-Green Deal and eurosceptic Motorists for Themselves party to enter parliament, as well as the nationalist Czech Communist Party (KSČM) – both potential ANO coalition allies.
Collective Defence or Unilateral Action
‘Citizens across the EU are growing weary of technocratic policies, leading to a surge in radical and nationalist movements. These are reinforced by geopolitical tensions, pushing European nations to prioritise self-reliance, border security and cultural identity over collective approaches. This could challenge EU unity, but it might also boost internal cohesion in addressing shared concerns like defence,’ says Valeriia Novak, a Visegrad Insight Future of Ukraine Fellow and Program Manager for the USAID RANG Programme.
The Polish government released its migration strategy for 2025-2030 on 17 October, a week after Tusk had announced that refugees would be temporarily barred from claiming asylum in the country after crossing the border from Belarus. This followed joint calls from Tusk and Czech PM Petr Fiala for the EU to ‘do more’ to tackle unauthorised migration. The Polish PM criticised new border checks in Germany as threats to Schengen free movement, explaining that the EU should ‘protect its outside borders and minimise illegal migration rather than create internal borders or mechanisms for relocating illegal migrants back and forth within Europe’.
Leaders backed Tusk’s strategy at the EUCO summit on 17 October, declaring that ‘Russia and Belarus cannot be allowed to abuse our values’ and that ‘Exceptional situations require appropriate measures’. Tusk thus showed Orbán the real meaning of EU security, as the Hungarian PM says he wants stronger borders, but instead lets Belarusians and Russians into the EU – and then threatens to send them to Brussels.
However, this renewed focus does risk empowering illiberal actors. Leaders are pushing the EC to write new guidelines for deportations to third countries, following the precedent set by Italy’s deal with Albania – which has hit major legal obstacles and condemnation from human rights groups.
Construction of the Eastern Shield has begun, with a budget of €3.3 billion allocated for 2024-2028. Poland and the Baltic States also pledged to strengthen their defence against ‘conventional as well as hybrid attacks’ during a summit in Sweden on 27 November. This followed calls from the Polish PM to set up a ‘navy policing’ force and establish ‘a solid group of states in solidarity,’ in response to the suspicious severing of two undersea cables. Evidence so far points to a Chinese merchant vessel travelling from Russia with a Russian captain.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was notably absent – officially because of the upcoming elections in Germany, following the collapse of his traffic light coalition, but unofficially because Eastern and Northern representatives were omitted from a meeting with US President Joe Biden in Berlin. German DM Boris Pistorius has acknowledged Polish criticism that Berlin needs to spend more on its military but continued his opposition to joint EU borrowing to fund defence spending. In contrast, frontrunner Friedrich Merz of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has said he is open to reforming Germany’s strict borrowing limits.
‘Crises have led to progress on European integration in the recent past, and this is more likely should Friedrich Merz become German Chancellor after early elections next February. He will probably find it easier than Olaf Scholz to coordinate politically with Emmanuel Macron in France and Donald Tusk in Poland,’ says Philipp Fritz, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Germany and foreign correspondent for WELT.
Brussels reportedly plans to change its spending rules on cohesion funds to redirect tens of billions of euros to defence. Only 5% of the €400 billion allocated from 2021-2027 to reduce economic disparities across member countries has been used, meaning EU capitals will be given more flexibility to spend the funds – although a ban on using the money to purchase weapons/ammunition will remain.
The EU is also nearing a deal on a new €1.5 billion fund to help bolster the bloc’s defence industry and assist Ukraine over the next three years. It would allow purchases of military equipment consisting of up to 35% of non-EU components.
New defence chief Andrius Kubilius has further floated a new mechanism for joint spending, to be disbursed as loans to member states, which could stand in as ‘front-loading’.
Enlarged EU or the Ivory-Tower
President Maia Sandu called out Russia’s ‘unprecedented assault’ on Moldova after presidential elections on 3 November, citing evidence that criminal groups aimed to buy 300,000 votes – and that pro-Russian fugitive businessman Ilan Shor channelled $39 million to voters in September and October. Nevertheless, Sandu won a run-off against pro-Russian Aleksandr Stoianoglo with 55% support. Moldovans also narrowly voted in favour of enshrining EU membership in their constitution, with the diaspora helping to swing a historic referendum and garner 50.03% support.
Tusk was quick to congratulate Sandu and called on support to continue in the coming months, under the Polish EUCO presidency and ahead of parliamentary elections in 2025. Orbán hosted the European Political Community and EUCO Summits in Budapest on 7-8 November, but it was only on the sidelines that Moldova’s allies came together to pledge further support – including Tusk, Klaus Iohannis, Ursula von der Leyen, Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer and Giorgia Meloni.
In contrast, thousands of Georgians have been protesting in Tbilisi for weeks in response to moves from the Georgian Dream (GD) Party to cement a pro-Russian path for the country. First, on 27 October, the electoral commission announced that GD had secured 54% of the vote – despite widespread reports of electoral fraud, including videos of ballot stuffing and voter intimidation. Then, on 28 November, PM Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Tbilisi was halting EU membership talks for the next four years. Far-right loyalist Mikheil Kavelashvili was also selected as the next president.
Many CEE officials have expressed concern, especially over the violent, Russian-style backlash of riot police. Opposition leaders have been arrested and Georgia’s Public Defender has said that 80% of those detained reported poor treatment. 13 EU member states also criticised Orbán for his ‘premature‘ visit to Georgia after the country’s election – which he celebrated before official results had even been published. However, EU sanctions on GD members were vetoed by Hungary and Slovakia, and only the Baltic States have agreed to impose national measures – with support for Georgia largely led by Kaja Kallas from her new role as the EU’s top diplomat.
Both Montenegro and Albania have made significant strides in hitting their accession criteria – and became the first-ever candidate countries to join the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) on 21 November. In this context, EU enlargement chief Marta Kos said ‘We have a realistic prospect to bring one or more enlargement countries to the finish line during this Commission’s mandate’.
The EC’s annual enlargement reports showed no progress for Serbia, however – no matter how ex-enlargement chief Olivér Várhelyi attempted to frame them. After a visit from Tusk, Aleksandar Vučić said Belgrade would ‘give our best’ to ‘accelerate’ its path to joining the EU. Yet in the same week, Vučić suggested Serbia could join the BRICS group in a matter of years. He also said it would negotiate a new long-term gas supply deal with Russia after the current one expires in March.
As for Ukraine, Tusk has said Poland will look to increase the speed of Kyiv’s integration during its EUCO presidency.
‘Ukraine has seen a significant acceleration in EU integration. This has been marked by the dual appointment of Olha Stefanishyna as the Vice-PM for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Justice Minister. A negotiation group has also been established and Kyiv has initiated screening processes and consultations with the EU,‘ says Valeriia Novak.
The EUCO also adopted a financial package that includes a loan of up to €35 billion for Ukraine; new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Ursula von der Leyen’s top team made a statement start by visiting Kyiv, where Kaja Kallas reaffirmed that Ukraine’s ‘strongest security guarantee is NATO membership’; and the EU approved a 15th sanctions package – after backlash from Latvia and Lithuania over a provision allowing Western companies to continue operating in Russia. North Korean involvement also pushed POTUS Joe Biden to lift the ban on Kyiv using long-range missiles on Russian territory.
The rush on the part of NATO and the EU to provide more aid to Ukraine, however, reflects a broader concern about Ukraine’s trajectory – looking to secure its position amid increasing noise around peace talks, ahead of Trump’s inauguration, as well as Russian escalation on the battlefield.
‘Tensions in the war have increased. Russia has suffered the highest daily rate of casualties, employed North Korean troops and even launched intercontinental ballistic missiles amid escalating nuclear threats…Ukraine is looking for more resources, most importantly through taxation reform, because we can count on far fewer external resources than in previous years,‘ says Oleksandr Kostryba, a Visegrad Insight Future of Ukraine Fellow and public policy expert.
Amid such escalation, Ukraine has lost 40% of the land it had seized in the Kursk region of Russia. Data from the Institute for the Study of War also shows that Russia has gained six times as much territory in 2024 as it did in 2023, and is advancing towards key logistical hubs in the eastern Donbas region and Pokrovsk. While Kyiv is planning to draft another 160,000 troops, it has received only 10% of US military aid approved by Congress earlier this year, Zelenskyy said on 30 October. 52% of Ukrainians are now in favour of negotiating peace with Russia as soon as possible, up from 26% in 2022 – according to a Gallup survey.
Ukrainian officials have held high-level talks with the incoming Trump administration, including a meeting between Andriy Yermak, Zelenskyy’s top aide, and Keith Kellogg, nominee for special envoy to Russia and Ukraine, Mike Waltz, incoming national security adviser, and VP-elect JD Vance.
Orbán has looked to wage in on ‘peace’ talks as a convenient context to criticise European neighbours. He has reportedly held several phone calls with Trump and Putin, most recently alleging that he struck an agreement for a ‘Christmas ceasefire’ – but that it was derailed by the Ukrainian side. Von der Leyen harshly rebuked Orbán’s programme in Strasbourg on 9 October, declaring that ‘There are still some who blame this war not…on Putin’s lust for power but on Ukraine’s thirst for freedom.’ Looking directly at Orbán, she asked: ‘Would they ever blame the Hungarians for the Soviet invasion of 1956?’.
Amid increasing ventures into international politics, Fico has likened Brussels to a ‘military cabinet’ and criticised both Kallas and new EUCO President António Costa for expressing support for Ukraine on behalf of the bloc. He has also backed the peace proposal of China and Brazil and expressed hope that Ukraine is in for a ‘nice Munich’ – referring to a 1938 deal that allowed Nazi Germany to annex the part of Czechoslovakia called Sudetenland in which mainly ethnic Germans lived. Fiala criticised ‘appeasement’ and ‘another Munich agreement,’ saying that strength alone would halt Russian aggression.
Kyiv and Warsaw outlined plans to establish a joint working group on the exhumation of Volhynia Massacre victims – an issue which has long tested relations between the two otherwise close allies, with Poland even suggesting it could block Ukraine’s EU accession. However, DM Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has said that Warsaw has provided as much military equipment as it can, explaining that ‘Russia has also threatened us, so there are limits to what we can do.’ After hosting Macron in Warsaw, Tusk said that Poland has no plans to send its troops to Ukraine.
EU lawmakers passed a document urging China to cease its ‘continued military operations,’ ‘economic coercion’ and ‘hostile disinformation’ against Taiwan. Taiwanese FM Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) also completed his inaugural visit to Europe with stops in Poland and Lithuania. The former focused on business opportunities, as Lin opened the Polish-Taiwanese Economic Cooperation Forum, and continued support for Ukraine. The latter marked the third anniversary of the Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius – Taiwan’s first de facto embassy in Europe – with the signing of memoranda of understanding to enhance collaboration in the drone industry.
However, ‘A look at Taiwan’s relations with Czechia and Lithuania can explain the sense of uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of relations between the island country and its Central European partners. The October elections in Lithuania caused perturbation in Taiwan as the new government calls for a normalisation of relations with Beijing. In Czechia, Babiš has repeatedly criticised the SPOLU coalition for failing to obtain ‘tangible results‘ from their exchanges with Taipei,‘ says Marcin Jerzewski 葉皓勤, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Poland, Head of the Taiwan Office of the European Values Center for Security Policy.
On 1 November, Slovakia and China declared that their relations would be elevated to a ‘strategic partnership’ and announced new cooperation in energy, transportation, logistics and infrastructure. Fico called his visit to Beijing – which was shrouded in secrecy – the ‘most important trip of the year’.
Between Dependence and Interdependence
EU tariffs on electric vehicles (EVs) from China, rising to 45%, kicked in on 30 October – after eight rounds of negotiations with the EC reached no conclusion. Chinese carmaker SAIC immediately announced plans to sue the EU, amid threats from Beijing that it will target key exports like pork, brandy and dairy. CEE was greatly divided on this point of strategic autonomy. Poland, the Baltics and Bulgaria voted in favour of tariffs, finding unlikely allies in France and Italy. Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia voted against tariffs, while Czechia, Romania, Croatia and Austria abstained. The prospect of the Trump administration imposing even higher tariffs on China leaves Budapest and Bratislava in a difficult position:
‘Orbán has been a loud supporter of Trump, but Hungary is heavily reliant on China economically: 44% of Chinese investments in the EU are in Hungary. With Trump‘s anti-China rhetoric, Orbán has to choose next year: will he follow Trump ideologically and abandon his pro-China policies, or will he choose to keep the economy afloat with Chinese money and drift further away from Trump,’ writes Luca Soltész, a Visegrad Insight Junior Fellow from Hungary.
Energy companies from several central European countries have been negotiating with counterparts to ensure gas flow continues after Russian Gazprom supplies via Ukraine expire on 31 December. This goes against the warnings of outgoing Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson, about the danger of concealing Russian gas from Ukraine by labelling it an import of another country – and so maintaining a reliance on Russia.
Hungary still gets at least 80% of its oil and gas supplies from Russia – and FM Péter Szijjártó has said negotiations with Gazprom for additional gas purchases in 2025 are ongoing. He met with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov for this purpose on 2 December, marking Szijjártó’s twelfth visit to Moscow since February 2022. Budapest has also reportedly found a solution that will allow it to pay for Russian gas via the Turkstream pipeline from Bulgaria without violating US sanctions imposed on Gazprombank on 21 November.
Hungary’s government submitted a bill to parliament to amend its nuclear plant contract with Russia and raise the cost of the project above its €12.5 billion value. Plans to build two new nuclear reactors at Paks were awarded in 2014, but have been delayed ever since. The project is often cited as a sign of closening ties between Hungary and Russia, but it also has domestic implications: Paks voted for an opposition mayor in June, after which Fidesz directed income tax from the plant away from the city budget and towards the state budget.
Similarly, Slovakia is holding a series of talks to secure gas supplies from Russia after its current transit contract expires at the end of 2024. Fico has expressed his desire to restore ‘normal relations’ and economic ties with Russia after an end to the war in Ukraine and said that he will travel to Moscow in May to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II – an event he referred to as ‘a peace rally’. Six MPs will travel to Moscow on 10 January, including SNS Chair Andrej Danko, who says he intends to discuss gas and oil supplies.
Sandu sacked Moldovan Energy Minister Victor Parlicov after he failed to reach an agreement with Gazprom to ensure the purchase of gas – on which the Moscow-backed breakaway region of Transnistria is heavily reliant. A state of emergency was then declared in the energy sector from 16 December, on the grounds that the cut-off of supplies to Transnistria could force Moldova to purchase lots of additional gas and stretch its reserves. This could be the first sign of cracks in the pro-EU movement under Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Parlicov, who is not a member of PAS, has stated that ‘Alternative [pro-EU] voices are needed’.
Russian gas imports to Czechia spiked in November, with more than 95% of gas flowing into the country via Slovakia – according to Net4Gas. Czechia has spent around €7 billion on Russian gas and oil imports since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine – according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. This is five times more than what Prague has sent in aid to Ukraine in the same period. However, the hope remains that Czechia will end its oil dependency on Russia in 2025 with the completion of the TAL pipeline enhancement.
On 31 October, the Czech antitrust office (ÚOHS) rejected US Westinghouse and French EDF complaints regarding the €16 billion Dukovany nuclear tender, so government officials and majority state-owned utility ČEZ expect South Korean KHNP to begin construction of new nuclear units by April 2025. ČEZ also bought a 20% share in Rolls Royce SMR, with plans to build the first Czech small modular reactor in the mid-2030s.
Poland’s Orlen also said it will stop importing Russian oil by mid-2025. It also cancelled the Olefin III petrochemical complex project – after a review of the company’s former, PiS-appointed management found that its cost had risen from an estimated €1.95 billion to €11.96 billion.
Tusk announced that his government plans to invest over €16 billion in clean energy – upgrading the electricity grid, modernising wind farms and seeking an investor for a second nuclear power plant. This followed the Polish Nuclear Power Plant’s (PEJ) announcement that it had secured letters of intent from Bpifrance and Sfil to invest over €3.5 billion in the construction of Poland’s first nuclear power plant. The government also pledged to invest €230 million in AI, including €46 million for an AI ‘factory’. Poland’s tech exports grew for the 12th year in a row in 2023, according to the Polish Development Fund.
Prosperity for All or the Few
Poland’s economic growth is projected to be the third-highest in the EU next year, driven by strong domestic consumption and public investment – according to the EC’s Autumn forecast.
In contrast, credit rating agency Moody’s has downgraded Slovakia by one notch to A3 with a stable outlook – based not on fiscal data but on a political evaluation of the reforms to the judiciary and media introduced by Fico’s government. Moody’s explicitly mentions changes to the Criminal Code, the dissolution of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and NAKA (the National Crime Agency responsible for combating corruption) as factors weakening the country’s oversight mechanisms.
‘The ruling coalition is unable to address the country’s fundamental problems and is instead attempting to appease voters with universal energy subsidies that will continue in 2025. Fico has declared that no household will pay even one euro more for electricity and heating next year. This measure will cost the state budget €235 million, further worsening the poor state of public finances,‘ writes Eva Mihočková.
Similarly, the Central Statistical Office revealed that Hungary’s GDP is at -0.7 and so officially in recession. Rather than follow expert advice, Orbán still pushes his plan of economic neutrality. He nominated Finance Minister Mihaly Varga to be central bank governor, turning to an ally who won’t criticise his policies like his predecessor, Gyorgy Matolcsy.
‘Earlier in the year, Orbán focused too much on his image internationally and ignored the needs of Hungarians. Now, Orbán announces that 2025 will be a fantastic year for the Hungarian economy, but the Hungarian Forint loses value day after day, and people are struggling with the recession,‘ says Luca Soltész.
Moody’s has also changed Hungary’s outlook from stable to negative over fears that a rift with the EU may cause it to lose substantial funding. The EC has agreed to release €799 million to Slovakia and Poland has received €9.4 billion from the EU’s National Recovery Plan (NRP). PM Viktor Orbán has meanwhile threatened to veto the EU’s 2028–2034 budget unless funds withheld over rule of law and corruption are released. Ironically, it is Fidesz that is in desperate need of EU funds to win back voter support. Magyar is pledging to restore investor trust by unlocking EU funds and ushering the country toward euro adoption if elected in 2026. EU countries will have to pass far more stringent conditions to access EU funds in the future, as per von der Leyen’s plans for the next EU budget.
CEE nations, especially those with highly export-oriented economies, are also deciding what to do about the prospect of Trump imposing tariffs on the EU.
‘In Czechia, there is definitely a high level of effort to find a common ground with the Trump administration. There is even a so-called competition between the opposition of Babiš and governing parties to decide who gets to be the biggest friend of Trump,’ says Pavel Havlíček, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Czechia and Research Fellow at AMO.
Babiš has slammed the Fiala administration for failing to revive Czechia’s lagging economy, promising to increase investment and funnel money into infrastructure – which he says can come from better tax collection and cuts to things like subsidies for EVs and NGOs. Yet Fiala says that the current government is on course to fulfil over 90% of its policies – with pension reform, revision of social benefits and labour laws the key priorities ahead of elections in October 2025.
‘Slovakia is possibly the most exposed country in the world when it comes to tariffs, as it relies on a robust car industry and has been the largest per capita producer. At the same time, Fico’s SMER party has made a sharp turn to the radical right in recent years which is reliant on an anti-American sentiment. It will be interesting to see how Fico adapts to Trump’s administration, which his electorate is expecting him to criticise,’ writes Albín Sybera, Contributing Editor for Visegrad Insight from Slovakia.
When it comes to CEE engagement with Taiwan with Trump back in the White House, ‘it is high time to prioritise substance over symbolism…Central European countries should act on synergies in their interests; this includes economic cooperation in sectors such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers in agricultural and food trade,‘ says Marcin Jerzewski 葉皓勤.
Plurality of Sources
Russian FIMI operations effectively undermined elections in Romania and Moldova. The EC has ordered TikTok to preserve data on Romanian presidential elections to aid in a future investigation, amid concerns about the amplification of content that ‘disproportionately’ favoured one candidate. TikTok has since removed a network covertly campaigning for Georgescu, while Meta has removed a network of accounts targeting Russian speakers in Moldova and promising to pay voters to cast ‘no’ ballots in a referendum on EU membership.
Ukraine also faced its largest cyberattack to date. Key Ministry of Justice systems were temporarily shut down after Russian hackers claimed to have stolen and destroyed over 1 billion data entries, including backups stored on Polish servers.
‘While Ukraine cannot hold elections due to martial law, it has had to significantly strengthen its capacity to combat disinformation since the onset of the full-scale war. This positions Kyiv as a valuable partner to the EU, especially under initiatives like the European Democracy Shield. It can offer its experience and best practices in countering disinformation, fostering resilience and safeguarding democratic processes in the face of hybrid threats,‘ says Valeriia Novak.
Speaking at the Smer Party congress, Fico reiterated that a ‘substantive conflict with mainstream media’ is inevitable, since the media and NGOs form ‘the greatest harm’ to Slovakia. To this end, coalition ally SNS proposed a new amendment to the country’s NGO Act that would classify NGOs as lobbyists rather than ‘foreign-funded’ groups – evading comparisons to Russian laws while still restricting NGO influence. Parliament also passed a bill introducing fees for access to public information, again submitted by the SNS and criticised by the Let’s Stop Corruption Foundation. Fico himself filed a lawsuit against Peter Bárdy, Editor in Chief of Aktuality, over his book ‘Fico – Obsessed with Power’.
The Czech Syndicate of Journalists called on the government to financially stabilise public media ahead of national elections in 2025 and an expected surge of parties which have pressured public media in the past. This coincided with increased debate over a major media law, aimed at raising Czech Television and Czech Radio concession fees. Czech Television management stated months ago that it would have to scale down its content production and reduce staff if financing is not strengthened – yet the law continues to face obstacles in parliament and opposition criticism.
Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) accused investigative outlet Átlátszó of threatening national sovereignty by expanding American influence. Rumours also abound that Orbán may use the incoming Trump administration to push Radio Free Europe out of Hungary.
An amendment to national security legislation has allowed the SPO to receive intelligence briefings straight from the National Information Centre (NIC), which collects intelligence from all Hungarian civilian and military agencies and reports directly to Orbán. The EC announced on 3 October that it is taking Hungary to the Court of Justice over its ‘Defence of Sovereignty’ law, arguing that the power granted to the SPO disproportionately affects CSOs, media outlets and journalists.
The legitimacy of Budapest’s state offices was again brought into question by a bombshell report from Direkt36 and De Tijd, which found that the Hungarian Information Office spied on EU officials from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) during their visits to the country between 2015-2017 – when OLAF was investigating Orbán’s son-in-law, Istvan Tiborcz.
State Capture or Independence
Fidesz has overseen an amendment to the Basic Law which would remove the requirement for Hungary‘s chief prosecutor to be chosen from current prosecutors. This could allow Orbán to appoint a loyalist for the following nine-year term – shielding him from legal challenges should Magyar be elected. With the 2026 elections in mind, Fidesz has also proposed to redraw voting districts so that Budapest, where Fidesz performs poorly, would lose two mandates. Ostensibly, this is designed to match population changes, but critics say it would unfairly bolster Fidesz’s chances.
Slovak central bank governor Peter Kažimír is very likely to escape a final verdict in a high-profile corruption case following criminal law amendments introduced by Fico’s government. So far, he refuses to explain how his partner received €1.5 million from a company associated with the Smer-linked oligarch Jozef Brhel, at a time when Kažimír was Finance Minister and Brhel secured lucrative state contracts.
Instead, the police inspectorate has launched criminal proceedings against former NAKA officers for alleged obstruction of justice – i.e., handling high-profile corruption cases with connections to previous Smer-led administrations. Michal Truban was also selected as new chairman of the Specialised Criminal Court by Smer member and Justice Minister Boris Susko. Truban has led the court twice before but made headlines recently by finding former Special Prosecutor and NAKA officer Dušan Kováčik guilty of corruption.
Controversial Justice Minister Pavel Blažek took over as chair of the Czech government’s anti-corruption body and immediately scrapped the minimum number of the body’s annual meetings (twice a year). Blažek has been under pressure from anti-corruption NGOs to resign over his interventions with state prosecutors involving ODS politicians, but he has also been backed by party ally Fiala. The Czech branch of Transparency International has warned that, should ODS continue to have no real interest in effective law enforcement against corruption (and only formally fulfill EC requirements), this could seriously damage public trust in state institutions.
Julia Przyłębska resigned as head of Poland‘s Constitutional Tribunal (TK) – two years after many experts argue her tenure should have ended. Tusk has struggled to undo PiS reforms on account of opposition from Przyłębska and her court, which PiS packed with favourable judges. This was evident in the recent TK verdict to overturn the decision of the National Electoral Commission (PKW) to reject PiS‘s financial report and cut its public funding. The PKW in turn ignored the TK verdict, leading to a legal stand-off that showcases Poland’s judicial divisions and could threaten elections next year.
Nevertheless, the ruling coalition has attempted to accelerate investigations into PiS loyalists. Central bank board member and former head of the Internal Security Agency under PiS Piotr Pogonowski was detained for questioning on PiS use of Pegasus spyware – and will likely be joined by former President of the Sovereign Poland party and Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro following his return to politics. Jarosław Kaczyński testified before the District Prosecutor’s Office in Warsaw as part of an investigation into fraud in the Justice Fund, which implicated Ziobro and former deputy Justice Minister Marcin Romanowski. A parliamentary investigation into PiS presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki has also been announced, in response to an onet report alleging his links to convicted criminals and neo-Nazi circles.
The commission on Russian and Belarusian influence in the previous PiS government unveiled its preliminary findings, including allegations of Polish financing of Russian influence ops in the US, undermining of Polish security services’ capabilities and a failure to prepare for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The commission also asked prosecutors to assess if ex-DM Antoni Macierewicz is guilty of ‘diplomatic treason.’ Tusk has announced another government investigation, this time into potential FIMI in the 2023 general election.
The Viasna human rights centre has called out Belarus’ authoritarian regime for a crackdown on dissent before presidential elections on 26 January – when Alyaksandr Lukashenka is widely expected to prolong his dictatorship. As part of this crackdown, Belarusian police have conducted exercises to ensure ‘the prevention of manifestations of extremism and terrorism’; the KGB has unleashed raids targeting relatives of political prisoners; and Lukashenka has even threatened to disconnect the internet should demonstrations like those after 2020 elections occur again.
Since 2020, over 3,500 individuals have been recognised as political prisoners by human rights organisations, and 65,000 people have been subjected to politically motivated persecution. In this context, activists have called out the ‘imaginary thaw’ between Lukashenka and his opponents – after a series of presidential pardons for small groups. While she admitted repression at the moment is too great, exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya called on Belarusians to be ready to protest. This followed her comments on the swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime: ‘In Syria, they had a dictatorship for 40 years. The regime fell quickly. This can happen fast, much faster than people think. They are very fragile, including Lukashenka’.
Polarisation or Cohesion 57% of Slovaks believe democracy in Slovakia is at risk – per an NMS Market Research survey – with the biggest issues perceived to be corruption, inadequate leadership, disinformation and growing populism and extremism. More than 5,000 people attended another mass demonstration in Bratislava against measures implemented by the Ministry of Culture, and protests spread across public sectors. The threat of a critical gap in hospital care was lifted after Health Minister Kamil Šaško signed an agreement with the head of the Doctors’ Trade Union. Nonetheless, over 3,000 doctors staged protest resignations, and teachers are now preparing to join in.
TISZA party supporters are also increasing demonstrations against Fidesz. Thousands of Hungarians gathered outside the country’s state television HQ on 5 October, protesting against what Magyar called the government’s ‘propaganda machine’. 100,000 attended Magyar’s rally to commemorate the 1956 Hungarian revolution against the Soviets, where he asked citizens to vote for the economy, education and healthcare.
On 19 November, Budapest faced off against EC lawyers and 16 EU countries in a mega-hearing over Hungary’s LGBTIQ+ law at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A ruling against Hungary could have far-reaching consequences, raising questions about whether the country has violated Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and therefore even belongs in the EU under its current leadership. Georgia signed a similar, Kremlin-inspired anti-LGBTQ+ bill into law on 3 October, introduced by the governing Georgian Dream party.
The EP also debated Poland’s abortion laws after a three-year UN investigation indicated that Polish women face blatant violations of their human rights. KO and the Left have made it clear they want to liberalise abortion rules, but reform has been impeded by the Third Way’s conservatism.
Serbia has seen significant protests in recent months, first in country-wide demonstrations against the Rio Tinto project, and then in response to the tragic death of 15 citizens after the collapse of a railway station roof in Novi Sad. One of the latter protests amassed more than 20,000 – the biggest protest seen in Novi Sad for decades. The tragedy has been tied to widespread negligence and corruption, implicating Vučić, PM Miloš Vučević and Parliament Speaker Ana Brnabić. Prosecutors have detained 11 persons for questioning, including Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Minister Goran Vesić. As demonstrations continue, police have used pepper spray to disperse crowds, and Vučić has warned that ‘All those taking part in the incidents will be punished’.
